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I. INTRODUCTION

It is a privilege for me to participate in this symposium on the
globalization of tort law. I am especially pleased to join this discussion with
eminent torts scholars such as Richard Cupp, John Goldberg, Mike Green,
Ellen Pryor, Allen Linden, Robert Rabin, Victor Schwartz, Jane Stapleton,
and Stephen Sugarman. I am the lone figure at this event who approaches
torts as a relative outsider, given my principal focus as a scholar is on
international law. Therefore, I will present my reflections from the
perspective of how international law can benefit from the mature and robust
system of domestic tort law in the United States and elsewhere.
While the law of nations has been around for centuries, modem
international law is young and immature, coming into its own only in recent
decades. Modem tort law, by contrast, is an advanced system of law that has
benefitted from over 150 years of analysis, established through thousands of
cases in dozens of countries. Until recently there was little overlap between
the two disciplines. For example, if one looks to the intellectual origins of
modem tort law, Oliver Wendell Holmes sharply distinguished international
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law and torts, with the former based on duties owed by one sovereign to
another, and the latter based on duties owed "from all the world to all the
world."'
Of course, in the Westphalian past, international law was the "law of
nations"-the special provenance and exclusive domain of nation-states.
International law was "the body of rules which the civilized States consider
legally binding in their intercourse," Lassa Oppenheim boldly declared in
the 1920 edition of his famous treatise on international law.2 It followed
that "sovereign States exclusively are International Persons-i.e. subjects of
International Law" and neither "monarchs, diplomatic envoys, private
individuals. . . churches ... chartered companies, nor ... organized
wandering tribes" enjoyed the status of "International Persons" who are
"subject[s] of the Law of Nations."
Today, the opposite is true. There is no question that international law
grants rights and imposes duties on entities other than states. The latest
edition of Oppenheim's treatise reflects this change: "The question whether
there could be any subjects of international law other than states was at one
time a matter of strenuous debate.. .. It is now generally accepted that there
are subjects other than states, and practice amply proves this."4
Individuals, international organizations, private and public corporations,
and territorial units other than states may, to a limited extent, be directly
subject to rights and duties under international law.' "[I]n the modern era,"
the Second Circuit held in Kadic v. Karadzic, the law of nations does not
"confine[] its reach to state action.... [C]ertain forms of conduct violate
the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of
a state or only as private individuals."6
Thus, at the time Holmes was writing, it was appropriate to separate tort
law from international law because the latter imposed duties only on states.
With the advent of modem international law, however, one can readily
identify a category of international law-analogous to domestic tort lawthat includes duties owed "from all the world to all the world."7 With this
dramatic change, tort law and international law are now inextricably
connected.
A central paradigm of tort law-at least for intentional torts-is a
prohibition on aggression, with liability attaching when a tortfeasor

1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REv. 1, 5-6
(1870).
2. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 125 (3d ed. 1920).
3. Id. at 125-26.
4. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 n.l (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992).
5. Id. at 16-22.
6. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
7. Holmes, supra note 1, at 6.
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subordinates a passive victim to his will.8 Almost all the modern cases
holding defendants liable for human rights violations comfortably fit within
that model. As George Fletcher has put it, "[t]here are no torts based on the
modem [international law] offences-genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity . . . [y]et they all stand for the same paradigm of liability,"

namely that "the defendant dominates a passive victim and acts aggressively
against him or her." 9 Despite the similarities between international human
rights law and tort law, scholars in both fields continue to labor in their own
vineyards, ignoring the benefits that could come from judicious grafting of
the two varieties of delict.
Imposing international responsibility on individuals and corporations is
of particular importance in the United States, where non-state actors are
increasingly subject to claims for monetary damages for alleged violations
of international law under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS").10 According to a
recent study commissioned by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, "there have
been some 150 ATS cases filed against corporations, with 120 (-80%)
arising in the past 15 years."' According to the study, "[w]hile most of the
cases have resulted in dismissals, there have been more trials (mostly
resulting in defense verdicts), plaintiffs' judgments (ranging from $1.5
million to $80 million), and settlements (ranging from $15.5 million to
reportedly $30 million) in recent years." 2
The largest jury award for an ATS violation was $766 million in

8. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 107 (2008).
9. Id. at 128. For other rare instances in which the two disciplines are analyzed, see W.V.H.
Rogers, Tort Law and Human Rights: A New Experience, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2002, at 35
(Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2003); TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION (Craig Scott
ed., 2001).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.").
11. Jonathan Drimmer, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Out-of-Court Tactics Employed by
Plaintiffs, Their Lawyers, and Their Advocates in Transnational Tort Cases, U.S. CHAMBER
INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 5 (June 2010), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/images/
stories/documents/pdflinternational/thinkgloballysuelocally.pdf
12. Id. The case of Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co.-in which the jury awarded $80 million in
damages-illustrates the trend. 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2008). The plaintiffs alleged a
conspiracy between a private corporation, Curacao Drydock, and the Cuban government to engage
in human trafficking, forcing the plaintiffs to work under threat of imprisonment. Id. at 1357. After
the district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the case based on forum non conveniens,
the corporation failed to adequately defend the suit and a default judgment was rendered against it
under the ATS. Id. A bench trial was held on the issue of damages and an award of $80 million was
made against the corporation. Id. at 1363-66.
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compensatory damages and $1.2 billion in punitive damages. 3
Corporations are rightly exercised about this new trend, as domestic tort
lawyers who have won billions in asbestos, toxic tort, and tobacco litigation
are now entering the potentially lucrative new field of human rights and
transnational tort litigation.14 One of the central concerns expressed in these
cases has been whether corporations may be liable for aiding and abetting
government abuse and, if so, the appropriate standard for imposing
liability-either "knowledge" of the government misconduct or some
evidence of a "purpose" to facilitate it."
The Second Circuit recently
challenged this trend, holding that claims against private corporations are not
actionable under the ATS.1 6 Scholars have presented competing views,
debating whether corporations should be held liable for violating
international law'" and diverging on the appropriate standard for liability.'

13. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (D. Haw. 1995),
aff'd, Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
14. See, e.g., Human Rights, MOTLEY RICE-ATrORNEYS AT LAW, http://www.motleyrice.com/
anti-terrorism-and-human-rights/human-rights (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) ("Motley Rice represents
individuals harmed by violations of international human rights law in the United States and abroad.
We fight to expose and hold accountable individuals, organizations, corporations and government
entities that infringe upon basic human rights . . . ."); International Law, CONRAD & SCHERER,
http://www.conradschcrcr.com/practice/international law.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) ("From
complicity in gross human rights violations to environmental disasters, the firm represents
individuals, families, cooperatives, companies, unions, indigenous groups and governments in
actions to hold multinational corporations accountable for wrongful conduct in Latin America.").
Not surprisingly, defense counsels have established special practice groups to defend corporations
against human rights litigation. See, e.g., Business and Human Rights, STEPTOE & JOHNSON,
http://www.steptoe.com/practices-263.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) ("[W]hereas the ATCA once
lay in obscurity, it now has been invoked in nearly 120 lawsuits against corporations . . . . Steptoe
advises companies on the scope and application of the human rights laws and expectations, and has
defended clients in some of the most prominent ATCA cases to date.").
15. Compare Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir.
2009) ("[W]e hold that the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability in ATS actions is
purpose rather than knowledge alone."), Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277
(2d. Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (requiring a showing that the defendant acted "with the
purpose of facilitating the commission of [the] crime"), and Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d
623, 654-55 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (adopting purpose test), with Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 288, 291 (Hall,
J., concurring) (arguing that liability should be found where an actor "knowingly and substantially
assist[s] a principal tortfeasor . . . ."), and In re S. African Apartheid Litig. v. Daimler AG, 617 F.
Supp. 2d 228, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding liability may extend where the "aider and abettor
know[s] that its actions will substantially assist the perpetrator . . . .").
16. See Kiobcl v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 06-4800, 2010 WL 3611392, at *22 (2d Cir.
Sept. 17, 2010) (holding that human rights abuse claims may not be brought against corporate
defendants under the ATS "because the customary international law of human rights does not
impose any form of liability on corporations (civil, criminal, or otherwise)").
17. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, Ill YALE L.1L 443, 524 (2001) (posing a theory of corporate aiding and abetting
liability based on the grounds that a "corporation's duties to protect human rights increase as a
function of its ties to the government"). But see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARv. L. REV. 869, 924-29 (2007)
(opposing the extension of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS to corporations absent further
action from Congress); Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort States and the War on
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In my own scholarship, I have avoided expressing an opinion on these
contentious subjects, concentrating instead on the ramifications of this new
trend and suggesting new ways to think about apportioning responsibility
among joint tortfeasors.19 Focusing on the contractual rights of corporations
to pursue contribution or indemnification claims against sovereign joint
tortfeasors in international arbitration, I have suggested that:
To the extent that corporations are increasingly subject to thirdparty claims for human rights violations arising out of or related to a
contract with a sovereign, one can anticipate that in the future
corporations will seek to shield themselves from this third-party risk
by invoking the arbitration clause in the contract against the
sovereign. In short, human rights litigation will lead to "who pays"
arbitration.2 0
Of course, an unstated assumption for any claim of contribution is that a
tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable and, therefore, subject to damages
above and beyond the harm caused by that tortfeasor's unlawful conduct.
Indeed, the unstated assumption in almost all international law litigation
appears to be that every defendant is jointly and severally liable for all harms
caused by the unlawful acts of every other joint tortfeasor.
The definitive work on remedies in international human rights law omits
any discussion of the subject of apportioning responsibility among codefendants. 2 Nor is the broader academic literature of any assistance. It
Terrorism, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 105, 126-27 (2005) (predicting a new wave of ATS lawsuits
against corporations designed to challenge U.S. conduct in the war on terrorism).
For various views on the topic of corporate liability for human rights abuses, see generally
HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
(Michael K. Addo ed., 1999); NICOLA M.C.P. JAGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS:

IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY (2002); Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporationsin the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 153 (1997); William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative
Analysis, 18 HUMAN RTS. Q. 368, 374-79 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations:
Confusion in the Courts, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008) (a broad discussion of the
competing "knowledge" and "purpose" tests of liability in international law); Chimine I. Keitner,
Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 90 (2008) (advocating that
liability be found where the corporation has "knowledge that [its] acts assist or facilitate the
commission" of a human rights violation); Teddy Nemeroff, Note, Untying the Khulumani Knot:
Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act After Sosa, 40 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 231, 285 (2008) (favoring a "purposeful" conduct test). For a general discussion
of historical standards of corporate liability in international law, see generally Ratner, supra note 17.

19. Roger P. Alford, ArbitratingHuman Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 517-29 (2008).
20.
21.

Id. at 526.
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2d ed. 2005).
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seems the question of apportioning responsibility among joint tortfeasors for
international law violations has been almost completely ignored.22 At a time
when individuals, corporations, and states are all subject to claims for taking
joint action to violate international law, this is a puzzling state of affairs.
There are numerous instances in which the question of apportioning
responsibility among joint tortfeasors has arisen in international practice.
Yugoslavia sued Canada before the International Court of Justice for the
injuries it suffered from NATO bombings of Kosovo. Canada is a member
of NATO but did not participate in the bombing campaign. Nonetheless,
Yugoslavia argued that joint and several liability could be imputed to
Canada because of the integrated command structure of NATO. 23 Canada
responded that "[j]oint and several liability for acts of an international
organization, or for the acts of other States acting within such an
organization, cannot be established unless the relevant treaty provides for
such liability." 24
Similarly, Holocaust victims sued German corporations in New York
federal court, alleging that they conspired with the Nazi regime to aid and
abet various Holocaust atrocities.25 In settling the case, the German
government and German corporations jointly contributed almost $5 billion
to a settlement fund, with the German government paying 75% and German
industry paying 25%.26 On what legal basis should the German government
and German industry have apportioned responsibility for payment of this
settlement amount?
In Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., Nigerian plaintiffs sued Chevron,

alleging that it aided and abetted human rights abuses of the Nigerian
government. 27 According to plaintiffs' version of events, Chevron aided and
abetted the death, torture, and inhumane treatment of innocent, peaceful
protesters by military personnel acting in concert with Chevron employees. 28

22. For a rare (but now dated) exception, see John E. Noyes & Brian D. Smith, State
Responsibility and the Principle of Joint and Several Liability, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 225 (1988).
Addressing joint responsibility for the unlawful conduct of states, Ian Brownlie has noted that "(tihe
principles relating to joint responsibility of states are as yet indistinct . . . . A rule of joint and
several liability in delict should certainly exist as a matter of principle, but practice is scarce." IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 457-58 (7th ed. 2008).

Transcript of Request for the Indication of Provisional Matters at 10, Yugoslavia v. Canada
12, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 06/4625.pdf.
Id.
See Otto Graf Lambsdorff, The Negotiations on Compensation for Nazi Forced Laborers, in
HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 170, 172 (Michael
J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006).
26. See id. at 173; Lothar Ulsamer, German Economy and the Foundation Initiative: An Act of
Solidarity for Victims of National Socialism, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
LITIGATION AND ITS LEGAGY 181, 185 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006).
27. 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1233 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
28. See Bowoto v. Chevron: The Murder and Torture of Nigerians Protesting the Oil Company,
CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/bowoto (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
23.
(May
24.
25.
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According to Chevron's version of events, its employees simply reported
criminal conduct of violent protesters and sought assistance from the
government to help rescue its workers who were held hostage by Nigerian
kidnappers.29 In December 2008, Chevron was cleared of all charges in a
jury trial in San Francisco, 30 but the case starkly presented circumstances of
potential joint tortfeasor liability, as well as plaintiffs' potential comparative
fault.
Finally, in perhaps the most ambitious example of an assertion of joint
tortfeasor liability for alleged international law violations, plaintiffs brought
suit against dozens of multinational corporations for allegedly supporting the
South African apartheid regime.31 The prayer for relief argued that the
corporations facilitated the South African government's unlawful practices,
including discriminatory employment practices, arbitrary arrest and
detention, forced exile, geographic separation, rape, torture, and extrajudicial
killings.32 This case presents extraordinarily difficult questions regarding
joint and several liability for injuries suffered by thousands of victims of
apartheid.
With the new wave of claims against corporations for human rights
violations-particularly in the context of aiding and abetting government
abuse-there are unusually difficult problems of joint tortfeasor liability. In
many circumstances, one tortfeasor-the corporation-is a deep-pocketed
defendant, easily subject to suit, but only marginally involved in the
unlawful conduct. Another tortfeasor-the sovereign-is a central player in
the unlawful conduct, but, with limited exceptions, is immune from suit
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act." A third tortfeasor-the lowlevel security personnel-accused of actually committing the atrocity, is
beyond the jurisdictional reach of the forum and is an insolvent, judgmentproof defendant.
How should an adjudicator apportion responsibility among these joint
tortfeasors? Does it matter that the principal players are immune or
insolvent, while the marginal player is not? In apportioning responsibility,
is it relevant that one tortfeasor simply knew of the misconduct or was
negligent with respect to its likely occurrence, although it did not intend for
the violation to occur? Despite the saliency of these questions, international
29. See Pamela A. MacLean, Corporate Liability Key in Chevron Case, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 20,
2008, http://www.1aw.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202425371532.
30. See Background: Hostage Takers Sue Chevron, CHEVRON.COM, http://www.chevron.com/
bowoto/background.aspx?view=2 (last updated April 2009).
31. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
32. See id.
33. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-05 (2006).
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law does not provide the answers.
These problems are only exacerbated by the fact that international law
violations can be pursued in multiple arenas-in national courts,
international tribunals, and international arbitral bodies. As a general rule,
international tribunals will resolve the question of apportioning liability
using public international law, while domestic courts will resolve the
question by recourse to private international law, and arbitral panels will rely
on the governing law of the contract. The approach for resolving questions
of apportionment will differ in these contexts, although each will resort to
domestic tort law in one way or another.
II.

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW APPROACH

With international law claims brought before international tribunals,
both the wrong and the remedy must be determined by reference to public
international law. As suggested above, this poses a problem because there is
insufficient guidance under international law with respect to questions of
apportioning responsibility. Neither international conventions nor custom
typically addresses such matters, and therefore international tribunals must
resort to general principles of international law to fill the void.
General principles, of course, are an accepted source of international
law, derived from the major legal systems of the world.34 International
tribunals will typically examine national systems in an effort to "identify
certain basic principles, or. . . 'common denominators' in those legal
systems." 35 General principles, "if common to a broad spectrum of national
legal systems, disclose an international approach to a legal question which
may be considered as an appropriate indicator of the international law on the
subject." 36 In short, common domestic law norms percolate upward to
become part of international law.
In the absence of existing international law on the subject, it is
appropriate to examine domestic tort laws to discern basic principles and
common denominators for apportioning responsibility among joint
tortfeasors. Such an approach focuses not on one domestic law, but instead
on the major legal systems of the world in order to formulate an appropriate
standard for international law. If a comparative analysis of tort law
identifies common denominators regarding the apportionment of
responsibility among joint tortfeasors, then domestic tort laws may be used

34. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945); see, e.g.,
Shannon and Wilson, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Org. of Iran, Iran Award No. 207-217-2 (1985),
reprinted in 9 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 397, 17.
35. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, T 439 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kuntj010222e.pdf (footnote omitted).
36. Id.
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to ascertain general principles of international law.17
There is no comprehensive analysis of domestic tort laws on this
question. However, preliminary research suggests that joint and several
liability is the accepted standard for apportioning liability, at least when the
The practice is sufficiently consistent
defendants are acting in concert.
that one can accurately describe it as a general principle of law, embodied in
the major systems of the world.
At the international level, the strongest support for this conclusion
comes from Judge Brunno Simma's separate opinion in the Oil Platforms
case.39 In Oil Platforms, the United States alleged that Iran violated its
treaty obligations by laying mines in the Persian Gulf during the decadelong Iran-Iraq war. 40 The United States could not prove that Iran, and not

37. Id.
38. This comparative research focused on scholarly commentary of tort laws in Austria,
Belgium, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Scotland, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. See Paul Ward, Ireland, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: TORT LAW 246 (Sophie Stijns ed., 2009) (discussing joint and several
liability in Ireland); Stephen Todd, New Zealand, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS:
TORT LAW 425-31 (Sophie Stijns ed., 2008) (discussing joint and several liability in New Zealand);
Hailing Shan, China, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: TORT LAW 163-64 (Sophie
Stijns ed., 2005) (discussing joint and several liability in China); UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW:
MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS (W.V.H. Rogers ed., 2004) (discussing joint and several liability under
Austrian, Belgian, Czech, English, German, Israeli, Italian, Dutch, Polish, Portuguese, South
African, Spanish, Swedish, Swiss, and United States law); GERT BROGGEMEIER, COMMON
PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW: A PRE-STATEMENT OF LAW 163-73 (2004) (discussing joint and several
liability in Germany); JOHN COOKE, LAW OF TORT 370-73 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing joint and
several liability in England); SIMON DEAKIN, ANGUS JOHNSTON & BASIL MARKESINIS, MARKESINIS
AND DEAKIN'S TORT LAW 1033-42 (6th ed. 2008) (discussing joint and several liability in England);
BASIL S. MARKESINIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A COMPARATIVE
TREATISE 843 (4th ed. 2002) ("Where several persons have caused harm, there is only one case
where it is right to combine their spheres of responsibility and thus make each responsible for the
contribution to the harm made by the others, and that is when ... the various persons causing the
harm caused it by means of 'a wrongful act committed jointly."'); G.H.L. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF
TORTS IN CANADA 885-907 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing joint and several liability in Canada);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 15 (2000) ("When persons are
liable because they acted in concert, all persons are jointly and severally liable for the share of
comparative responsibility assigned to each person engaged in concerted activity."); WALTER VAN
GERVEN, JEREMY LEVER & PIERRE LAROUCHE, TORT LAW 430-66 (2000) (discussing joint and
several liability in England, France, and Germany); I CHRISTIAN VON BAR, THE COMMON
EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS 334-38 (1998) (discussing joint and several liability in Denmark,
England, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, and Sweden); JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF
TORTS 288-301 (9th ed. 1998) (discussing joint and several liability law in Canada).
39. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 324 (Nov. 6) available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/90/9735.pdf (separate opinion of Judge Simma).
40. Oil Platforms, 2003 1.C.J. at 174, 1 23, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/90/
9715.pdf (majority opinion).
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Iraq, was the sole cause of any particular mine laying activity.41 Judge
Simma's solution was to undertake a comparative analysis of domestic tort
laws and hold Iran jointly and severally liable for all of the mine laying
activity in the Persian Gulf.4 2 As Judge Simma put it:
I have engaged in some research in comparative law to see whether
anything resembling a "general principle of law"... can be
developed from solutions arrived at in domestic law to come to
terms with the problem of multiple tortfeasors. I submit that we
find ourselves here in what I would call a textbook situation calling
for such an exercise in legal analogy.. . . [R]esearch into various
common law jurisdictions as well as French, Swiss and German tort
law indicates that the question has been taken up and solved by
these legal systems with a consistency that is striking.43
Thus, a survey of American, Canadian, British, French, Swiss, and
German tort law led Judge Simma to conclude that joint and several liability
"can properly be regarded as a 'general principle of law' ..... "" When
elevated to the level of international law, this approach "would lead to a
finding that Iran is responsible for damages ... that it did not directly
cause."45 Thus, Judge Simma argued that cases such as Summers v. Tice-in
which two hunters were held liable for one injury to the plaintiffs eye 46
should become a source for international law, such that two nations laying
mines in navigable waters can be held responsible for the resulting injuries
without evidence of direct causation.47
What is far less clear from a comparative analysis is whether joint and
several liability is the accepted standard when multiple tortfeasors are not
acting in concert. In undertaking his analysis of American law, Judge
Simma relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the famous case of

Summers v. Tice 48 to support his conclusions regarding joint and several
liability. But he ignored the Restatement (Third) of Torts published three
years before his separate opinion in Oil Platforms. The most recent
Restatement concludes that "there is currently no majority rule" on the
question of liability for independent tortious conduct of multiple tortfeasors

41. Id. at 175, 1 23; 217, 1123.
42. Id. at 353-54,
64-67 (separate opinion of Judge Simma).
43. Id. at 354, 166.

44. Id. at 358, 174.
45. Id. at 357, 173.
46. 199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948).
47. Oil Platforms, 2003 1.C.J. at 354-55, 1 67 (separate opinion of Judge Simma). The majority
of the Court rejected Judge Simma's approach, concluding that "[tihe United States has not
demonstrated that the alleged acts of Iran actually infringed the freedom of commerce" in violation
of Iran's treaty obligations. Id. at 217, 1 123 (majority opinion).
48. Summers, 199 P.2d 1.
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who cause an indivisible harm.49 Instead, the Restatement presents five
independent tracks for apportioning liability: (1) joint and several liability;o
(2) several liability; 5 ' (3) joint and several liability with reallocation;5 2 (4)
hybrid liability based on a threshold percentage of comparative
responsibility;13 and (5) hybrid liability based on the type of damages. 54
These different tracks reflect different approaches adopted by the fifty states,
which take a number of factors into account, including allocating the risk of
a tortfeasor's insolvency or immunity, the relevance of the plaintiff's
comparative responsibility, the degree of fault among joint tortfeasors, and
the type of harm caused by the tortious conduct.55 Significantly, the
approach suggested by Judge Simma-that of pure joint and several
liability-is embraced by less than one-third of the jurisdictions in the
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY

§ 17 cmt. a

(2000).

50. Id § A18 ("If the independent tortious conduct of two or more persons is a legal cause of an
indivisible injury, each person is jointly and severally liable for the recoverable damages caused by
the tortious conduct."). Fifteen jurisdictions in the United States have adopted some form of this
track, although Minnesota also follows another track. See id. § 17 cmt. a.
51. Id. § B 18 ("If two or more persons' independent tortious conduct is the legal cause of an
indivisible injury, each defendant, subject to the exception stated in § 12 [intentional tortfeasors], is
severally liable for the comparative share of the plaintiff's damages assigned to that defendant by the
factfinder."). Sixteen jurisdictions in the United States have adopted some form of this track,
although Michigan also follows another track. See id § 17 cmt. a.
52. Id. § Cl 8 ("Ifthe independent tortious conduct of two or more persons is a legal cause of an
indivisible injury, each person is jointly and severally liable for the recoverable damages caused by
the tortious conduct, subject to the reallocation provision of § C21."). This approach imposes the
financial risk of insolvency on all legally responsible parties, including plaintiffs and defendants, in
proportion to their responsibility. See id. § C21 cmt. a. Eleven jurisdictions in the United States
have adopted some form of this track, although four states-Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, and
New Hampshire-also follow another track. See id. § 17 cmt. a.
53. Id. § D18 ("If the independent tortious conduct of two or more persons is a legal cause of an
indivisible injury, each defendant who is assigned a percentage of comparative responsibility equal
to or in excess of the legal threshold is jointly and severally liable, and each defendant who is
assigned a percentage of comparative responsibility below the legal threshold is, subject to the
exception in § 12 (intentional tortfeasors), severally liable."). One rationale for this threshold
approach is based on the unfairness of requiring a minimally responsible tortfeasor to pay all of the
plaintiffs recoverable damages. See id § D18 cmt. c. Ten jurisdictions in the United States have
adopted some form of this track, although six states-Hawaii, Iowa, Montana, New Hampshire, New
York, and Ohio-also follow another track. See id. § 17 cmt. a.
54. Id. § El 8 ("If the independent tortious conduct of two or more persons is a legal cause of an
indivisible injury, each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the economic-damages portion of
the recoverable damages and, subject to the exceptions stated in § 12 (intentional tortfeasors) and §
15 (persons acting in concert), is severally liable for that defendant's comparative share of the
noneconomic damages."). The rationale for this approach is to impose the financial risk of
insolvency of a legally responsible party on defendants for the plaintiffs economic damages and on
the plaintiff for the plaintiffs noneconomic damages. See id § E18 cmt. d. Eight jurisdictions in
the United States have adopted some form of this track, although four states-Hawaii, Iowa, New
York, and Ohio-also follow another track. See id § 17 cmt. a.
55. Id. § 10 cmt. a, § 17 cmt. a.
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United States, fewer jurisdictions than the number that employ pure several
liability.5

Other countries also employ several liability for independent actions of
multiple tortfeasors." For example, China utilizes joint and several liability
for joint action, but otherwise each tortfeasor who commits independent acts
will "bear corresponding compensation liabilities respectively in appropriate
proportion to the extent of their faults. .. ."' New Zealand has a similar
approach, applying joint and several liability for the joint action, but several
liability where "there is a coincidence of separate acts that by their conjoined
effect cause damage." 59 If two tortfeasors act independently of one another,
then each is liable only for that portion of the damage caused.o Israel also
has adopted joint and several liability where tortfeasors act in concert, but
several liability where there is independent action. 6 1 "The general rule is
that tort liability is individual: every tortfeasor is held liable for the damage
caused by his own person." 62
These disparate approaches suggest that there is no settled standard for
One
apportioning liability for independent acts of multiple tortfeasors.
comparative scholar surveyed the laws of fifteen countries and concluded

56. Id. § 17 cmt. a. Fifteen jurisdictions adopt pure joint and several liability: Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia.
See id. Sixteen jurisdictions adopt pure several liability: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, and Wyoming. See id. The remaining twenty jurisdictions adopt hybrid approaches. See
id.
57. See Bernhard A. Koch & Peter Schwarzenegger, Multiple Tortfeasors Under Austrian Law,
in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS 9, 12 (W.V.H. Rogers ed., 2004) (where

tortfeasors acted independently, general rule is several liability); Johann Neethling, Multiple
Tortfeasors Under South African Law, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS

175, 177 (W.V.H. Rogers ed., 2004) (several liability under South African law where multiple
tortfeasors acting independently of one another cause harm to a victim); Bill Dufwa, Multiple
Tortfeasors Under Swedish Law, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS 215, 221

(W.V.H. Rogers ed., 2004) (several liability under Swedish law where multiple tortfeasors acting
independently of one another cause divisible harm to a victim); Christine Chappuis, Gilles
Petitpierre & B6n6dict Winiger, Multiple Tortfeasors Under Swiss Law, in UNIFICATION OF TORT
LAW: MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS 231, 238 (W.V.H. Rogers ed., 2004) (several liability under Swiss
law for low-fault tortfeasor where multiple tortfeasors acting independently of one another cause
harm to a victim).
58. Hailing Shan, China, in I INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: TORT LAW 163
(Sophie Stijns ed., 2005).
59. Stephen Todd, New Zealand, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: TORT LAW

425 (Sophie Stijns ed., 2008).
60. Id.
61.

Israel Gilead, Israel, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: TORT LAW 179

(Sophie Stijns ed., 2003).
62. Id.
63. The absence of a consensus across domestic systems itself is important, "as it may throw
light on the intricacies of the problem involved." HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW:

COLLECTED PAPERS 72 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970).

244

[Vol. 38: 233, 2011]

Apportioning Responsibility
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

that an appropriate standard would impose several liability for independent
tortfeasors who cause divisible harm but joint and several liability where
they cause indivisible harm. 4
In sum, preliminary research would suggest that joint and several
liability is a generally accepted norm when a tortfeasor "knowingly
participates in or instigates or encourages wrongdoing by others which
It is not clear, however, that the same
causes damage to the victim ....
applies when tortfeasors act independently of one another. 6 Establishing a
general principle of international law based on a survey of domestic tort
laws requires a careful appreciation of such nuances.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that recourse to general principles is
controversial in this context because, in Ian Brownlie's words, "municipal
analogies are unhelpful" for discerning principles for joint responsibility of
states. Commentary on the International Law Commission's DraftArticles
on State Responsibilityunderscores that one should not

assume that internal law concepts and rules in this field can be
applied directly to international law. Terms such as "joint," "joint
and several" and "solidary" responsibility derive from different
legal traditions and analogies must be applied with care. In
international law, the general principle in the case of a plurality of
responsible States is that each State is separately responsible for
conduct attributable to it ... .

The principle of independent

responsibility reflects the position under general international law,
in the absence of agreement to the contrary between the States
concerned.

64. W.V. Horton Rogers, Comparative Report on Multiple Tortfeasors, in UNIFICATION OF TORT
LAW: MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS 271, 308-09 (W.V.H. Rogers ed., 2004).
65. Id. (The quote is an excerpt from a proposed Model Law on apportioning liability among
multiple tortfeasors.).
66. This scenario, of course, more closely fits the facts of the Oil Platforms case: Iran and Iraq
were not acting in concert when they laid mines in the Persian Gulf, although tort laws often have
special rules when tortfeasors act independently of one another but the source of the harm is
unknown.
67. Brownlie, supra note 22, at 457.
68. INT'L LAW COMM'N, DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, WITH COMMENTARIEs art. 47, cmt. 3 (2001), available at
see also Certain
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6-2001.pdf,
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 258-59, 262 (June 26), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/80/6795.pdf.
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Of course, as the circumstances of international law change, the
appropriateness of recourse to general principles also changes. As Hersch
Lauterpacht put it, "[t]he proper task ... is not to disdain the search for
general legal principles on the ground that the relations of States are wholly
different; [the] task is . .. to ascertain the general principle in question and
then to relate it to the specific character, if any, of international
relations ... "69 Now that international law has been transformed into a
system that imposes rights and duties on non-state actors, it is uncertain
whether this traditional approach is still appropriate. Nor is it clear whether
a non-state actor can invoke this rule to argue that it should only be held
responsible for conduct attributable to it. Given this confused state of
affairs, it is surprising that there has been so little effort by the bar, the
bench, or the academy to clarify the situation.
III.

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPROACH

International law violations brought before domestic courts present
different issues. In such circumstances, domestic tort law is critically
important when addressing remedies, either by reference to the lex fori (the
law of the forum) or the lex loci delecti (the law of the place of the wrong).
If one relies on the lex fori, then the substantive law would be
determined by international law and the remedy by the domestic law of the
forum. 70 As Joseph Story put it in his 1834 Commentaries on the Conflict of
Laws:

It is universally admitted and established that the forms of remedies
and the modes of proceeding and the execution of judgments are to
be regulated solely and exclusively by the laws of the place where
the action is instituted; or, as the civilians uniformly express it,
according to the lex fori.... All that any nation can therefore be
justly required to do, is to open its own tribunals to foreigners, in
the same manner and to the same extent as they are open to its own
subjects, and to give them the same redress, as to rights and wrongs,
which it deems fit to acknowledge in its own municipal code. . . .

69. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 63, at 72.
70. That does not mean, however, that every question of remedies is resolved by reference to the
law of the forum. In many jurisdictions, the type of remedy is governed by substantive law, while
the calculation of remedies is governed by the lex fori. Michael Pryles, Tort and Related
Obligations in Private International Law, 227 RECUEIL DES CoURS 21, 192-93 (1991); J. G.
COLLIER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 60, 65 (3d ed. 2001).
71. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC 77374 (8th ed. 1883); see also David Bederman, Compulsory Pilotage, Public Policy, and the Early
Private InternationalLaw of Torts, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1033, 1070 (1990) ("[W]hen a cause of action
arose abroad, the lex loci governed the rights at issue, while the law of the forum (lexfori) ruled the
procedure and remedies available.").
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More recent commentary supports this view. "In international private
law the distinction between substance and procedure is an important one
since matters of substance are generally determined by the lex causae while
matters of procedure are governed by ... the law of the country to which the
court where any legal proceedings are taken belongs."72 One component of
procedural law is, of course, remedies. As such, the wrong is determined
by international law, but the remedy by the law of the forum.
The remarkable pre eminence [sic] of the lexfori proceduralisover
the applicable substantive lex causae ... has shown itself to be a
legal tool capable of accommodating a variety of forum interests
and standards. These are local or national forum standards often
distinct from those provided by the applicable law. They comprise
the calculation of damages, limitation periods and most of the other
equitable remedies . .

..

Given that the United States is the principal domestic forum for
resolving international human rights violations, its approach to apportioning
liability will be of particular importance. While the question remains
unsettled, one can hazard the standard courts will apply to apportion
damages based on the standard they have applied to measure damages.
In the United States, damages for transnational torts are assessed in light
of numerous choice-of-law principles, with the law of the state having the
dominant interest typically being determinative. 75 That is, the law of the
state with the most significant relationship to the conduct and the parties will
generally apply, taking into account where the tortioug conduct and injury
occurred, where the parties are domiciled or have their place of business,
Other factors taken into
and where the parties' relationship is centered.
account include (1) the needs of the international system; (2) the policies of
the forum, other interested states, and the particular field of law; (3) "the
protection of justified expectations"; (4) concerns for certainty,
72. GERNOT BIEHLER, PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2008).

73. See, e.g., COLLIER, supranote 70, at 64-66.
74. BIEHLER, supranote 72, at 31.
75.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§

6, 145, 171 (1971).

Of course, the

several States have adopted widely-divergent choice-of-law regimes. With respect to torts, twentyfour states apply the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws approach, ten states apply a
traditional Restatement (First)ofConflict ofLaws approach, and the remaining eighteen jurisdictions
(including D.C. and Puerto Rico) adopt some other approach. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of
Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 231-32
(2010); Donald Earl Childress, III, When Erie Goes International,105 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2011).
76. Id. §§ 145, 171.
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predictability, and uniformity; and (5) ease in determining and applying the
law."
Not surprisingly, with so many factors in the mix, courts have wide
discretion to use the law with which they are most comfortable. In the
United States, courts assessing damages for international law violations have
politely nodded in the direction of other countries but typically applied
remedies in reliance on local law.
In addressing choice-of-law questions regarding remedies for
international law violations, courts have devised a federal common law
approach that relies on the law of a foreign jurisdiction when it does not
frustrate Congress's purpose in outlawing international law violations, but
otherwise courts will fashion a common law remedy based on principles
derived from federal or international law.
For example, in Filartigav. Pena-Iralasothe Eastern District of New
York, on remand from the Second Circuit,8 1 emphasized that when Congress
enacted the Alien Tort Statute, it gave federal courts the "power to choose
and develop federal remedies to effectuate the purposes of the international
law incorporated into United States common law." 82 The court's emphasis
was on the nature of the offense and the transcendent "interests of the global
community," and it sought to fashion a remedy that fit the offense.83 "If the
courts of the United States are to adhere to the consensus of the community
of humankind, any remedy they fashion must recognize that this case
concerns an act so monstrous as to make its perpetrator an outlaw around the
globe." 84
Given that all relevant facts in Filartigaoccurred in Paraguay, the court
stressed that the strong nexus to Paraguay required it to "look first to
Paraguayan law in determining the remedy for the violation of international
law."85 But because Paraguay would not hold the perpetrator responsible for

77. Id §§ 6, 145.
78. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[L]ocal law of the state
where the wrongs and injuries occurred and the parties reside may be relevant and may apply . . .
insofar as it is substantively consistent with federal common law principles and international law and
provides a remedy compatible with purposes of the ATCA and pertinent international [law]
norms. . . ."); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1158 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 2004) ("If a choice of law
analysis is necessary to determine the applicability of punitive damages, this Court may look to the
law of El Salvador, but only to the extent it does not frustrate the very purpose of the ATCA.").
79. Tachiona, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 411 (citing Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 948 (9th Cir. 2002),
vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005)); Abebe-Jera v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11 th Cir. 1996);
In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1994); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162,
189-91 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1547-48 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
80. 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
81. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
82. Filartiga,577 F. Supp. at 863.
83. Id. at 863-64.
84. Id. at 863.
85. Id. at 864.
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his conduct, the court concluded it would be unfair to apply that law." It
also concluded that, despite Paraguayan law precluding punitive damages
and the paucity of international tribunal precedent supporting punitive
The court reasoned that the
damages, such damages were appropriate.
"objective of ... making torture punishable as a crime can only be
vindicated by imposing punitive damages" 88 and awarded $385,364 in
compensatory damages and $10 million in* punitive damages. 89
Likewise in Doe v. Saravia,90 a federal court in California concluded
that application of El Salvadorian law would frustrate the purpose of the
Alien Tort Statute because it did not support the award of punitive
damages. 9' Relying on Filartiga and similar cases, the court devised a
federal common law remedy, concluding that "even under a choice of law
analysis, plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages" totaling $5 million. 92
By contrast, in In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, the

court ruled that "[b]ecause Congress ... offered no methodology as to how
damages should be determined, federal courts are free to and should create
federal common law to provide justice for any injury contemplated by the
Alien Tort Statute and the TVPA or treaties dealing with the protection of
human rights." 93 In crafting a federal common law remedy, the court relied
on Philippine law-which permitted exemplary damages-to award $1.2
billion in exemplary damages against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. 94
These cases, of course, are not dealing directly with the question of
apportioning liability among joint tortfeasors. But these and similar cases
suggest that courts will fashion federal common law in determining not only
the measure of damages, but also the division of damages among joint
tortfeasors.
As of yet, there is no clear federal authority on the appropriate standard
for apportioning liability for international law violations. On occasion,
courts have awarded joint and several liability for international law
violations, but they have done so without analysis.95 In other cases, courts
86. Id
87. Id. at 864-65.
88. Id. at 864.
89. Id. at 867.
90. 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
91. Id.atll58n.4.
92. Id. at 1159.
93. 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1469 (D. Haw. 1995).
94. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772, 780, 787 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing
application of Philippine law by district court).
95. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Imperial Nurseries, No. 3-07-CV-193(JCH), 2008 WL 2572250 (D.
Conn. May 28, 2008) (ordering default judgments against defendants, jointly and severally); Stem v.
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simply have assumed that joint and several liability applies because that is a
traditional remedy in the domestic context.96 The most prominent analysis
of the problem, that of Judge Reinhardt's concurring opinion in Doe I v.
Unocal,97 was vacated by the Ninth Circuit en banc. Thus, to date there is
no authoritative pronouncement establishing a federal common law remedy
ofjoint and several liability for international law violations.
Perhaps an approach similar to the one courts have developed in
calculating damages will emerge: rely on the law of the foreign jurisdiction
when it does not frustrate Congress's purpose in outlawing international law
violations; otherwise, fashion a remedy based on principles derived from
federal law or international law embodied in federal common law.98 That
approach would be consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of

Laws, which adopts a multi-factor test for addressing joint torts.99 It is also
consistent with the Restatement's approach for determining the applicable
law for apportioning liability, which "will usually be the local law of the
state where the injury occurred."' 00
Of course, because the question of apportioning liability for
international law violations has yet to be resolved in the United States, one
should exercise caution in making assumptions. This is particularly so given
that federal courts, in apportioning liability, typically rely principally on the
Restatement of Torts to assist them in fashioning federal common law. '01As
Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F. Supp. 2d 286, 292 n.5 (D.D.C. 2003) ("Hizbollah's 'acts, which
were intentionally committed by Sutherland's captors, are attributable to the defendants because the
defendants substantially funded and controlled Hizbollah . . . [.] As such, the defendants are liable
under the tort doctrines of respondeat superior and joint and several liability."').
96. See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 n.3 (C.D. Cal.
2005) ("Defendant has not directly challenged whether joint and several liability theories are
available under the TVPA. However, the Court has no reason to think that it is unavailable."); Nat'l
Coal. Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 358 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("Unocal
contends, without authority, that this long-established rule only applies in some subset of 'usual
cases.' The fact that the underlying torts at issue here are not 'ordinary' does not establish, as
Unocal would have it, that a joint tortfeasor found liable for those torts is not subject to the usual
joint and several liability.").
97. 395 F.3d 932, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) ("The principle that a member
of a joint venture is liable for the torts of its co-venturer is well-established in international law and
in other national legal systems. International legal materials frequently refer to the principle ofjoint
liability for co-venturers. . . . The status of joint liability as a general principle of law is supported
not only by international law sources but also by the fact that it is fundamental to 'major legal
systems."').
98. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§

6, 145, 171, 172 (1971).

100. Id. § 172.
101. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 327 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[A]s a
general matter, the Supreme Court and this Court have often turned to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts for assistance in developing standards in a variety of tort cases."); United States v. Hercules,
Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001) ("The universal starting point for divisibility of harm
analyses in CERCLA cases is the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides for the
apportionment of damages among two or more parties when at least one is able to show either (1)
'distinct harms' or (2) a 'reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single
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noted above, the most recent Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of

Liability "takes no position on whether joint and several liability, several
liability, or some combination of the two should be adopted for independent
tortfeasors who cause an indivisible injury."l 02 If the tortfeasors acted in
concert or committed an intentional tort, then the matter is relatively
straightforward: joint and several liability will apply.'o3 Absent those
circumstances, courts are divided and forced to make hard choices about
allocating risk between the plaintiffs and defendants on matters such as a
tortfeasor's insolvency, immunity, and settlement.'0
IV.

HYBRID INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION APPROACH

With the proliferation of human rights litigation, it is increasingly
plausible that non-state actors will be held liable for international law
violations in domestic courts and subsequently seek a contribution claim
against a sovereign joint tortfeasor in international arbitration. As I have
explained in detail elsewhere, human rights litigation in domestic courts
typically precludes claims against states and state entities because of
sovereign immunity.'0 o In lieu of such a claim, plaintiffs will bring an
action against a corporation for aiding and abetting government abuse. If the
corporation is held liable, it often will have a contractual right to pursue
arbitration against the sovereign for contribution.'06 As I have argued:
If a corporation is engaging in joint action with government actors,
then almost by definition the parties are acting pursuant to some
contractual relationship .... If this is so, then the contract between
the corporation and the sovereign may well govern the question of
shared responsibility for third-party harms .... [A]n arbitration

harm.').
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY

§ 17 cmt. a (2000).

103. Id. § 12 ("Each person who commits a tort that requires intent is jointly and severally liable
for any indivisible injury legally caused by the tortious conduct."); id. § 15 ("When persons are
liable because they acted in concert, all persons are jointly and severally liable for the share of
comparative responsibility assigned to each person engaged in concerted activity.").
104. Id. § 10 cmt. a, § A19 cmts. d-e, § B19 cmts. d-e, § C19 cmts. d-e, § D19 cmts. d-e, § 24.
105. See Alford, supranote 19, at 517-28.
106. There are numerous instances in which courts have upheld the right to pursue contribution
claims in arbitration and have enforced arbitral awards granting contribution among joint tortfeasors.
See, e.g., TD Ameritrade, Inc. v. McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel Sec., Inc., 953 A.2d 726, 737-38 (Del.
Ch. 2008); CBP Res., Inc. v. SGS Control Serys. Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 733, 738-47 (M.D.N.C.
2005); Branigan v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 547, 547-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Gershen
v. Hess, 558 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); see also Alford, supra note 19, at 522-24
(discussing cases involving arbitration of contribution claims).
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clause in an international agreement with a sovereign is an
extraordinarily common vehicle to secure accountability for
sovereign breaches or other illegal conduct arising out of or relating
to the agreement.' 0
Assume, for example, that in litigation in the United States, a
corporation is found to be 10% at fault (and the government 90% at fault)
for an international human rights violation against third-party victims
committed in a developing country. Under the emerging federal common
law standard outlined above, the corporation might be held jointly and
severally liable and required to pay $10 million in damages. That
corporation could then pursue a contribution claim against the sovereign
joint tortfeasor in international arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause
in the contract.
How would an international arbitral panel seized with such a matter
resolve the question? Absent a governing law clause, it might use either a
public or private international law approach to resolve the question of
contribution. More typically the contract would include a governing law
clause and also specify the situs for arbitration, thereby establishing the lex
arbitri governing the dispute. Thus, in a typical arbitration clause, both
substantive and procedural law would be chosen by the parties to the
arbitration, and with limited exceptions, the panel would be bound to apply
those choices in resolving the dispute. International arbitration thus presents
a "hybrid" approach because the standard for joint and several liability
applied by a domestic court in a claim by a victim against one tortfeasor may
not be the same as the standard applied by an international arbitral panel
resolving a question of contribution between one tortfeasor and another.
To illustrate this situation, assume in the above hypothetical that the
corporation and government entity executed a joint venture agreement that
included a waiver of sovereign immunity and a broadly-worded arbitration
clause providing for "any dispute arising out of or in connection with the
contract" to be subject to international arbitration. Assume further that the
contract was governed by either English law with arbitration in England, or
alternatively, New York law with arbitration in New York.
In the first scenario, English law authorizes a contribution claim brought
by one joint tortfeasor against another, stipulating that "any person liable in
respect of any damage suffered by another person may recover contribution
from any other person liable in respect of the same damage." 08 Assessing
the allocation of fault is subject to the sound discretion of the court, with
English law stipulating that "the amount of the contribution recoverable
107. Alford, supra note 19, at 517-18, 520.
108. Civil Liability (Contribution) Act, 1978, c. 47, § 1(1) (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.
gov.ukfRevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1978/cukpgaj19780047_en1; see generally DEAKIN, JOHNSTON
& MARKESINIS, supra note 38, at 1034-40; COOKE, supra note 38, at 370-73.
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from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just and
equitable having regard to the extent of that person's responsibility for the
damage in question."' 09 Significantly, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act
of 1978 imposes a significant limitation on claims for contribution:
"References in this section to a person's liability in respect of any damage
are references to any such liability which has been or could be established in
an action brought against him in England and Wales by or on behalf of the
person who suffered the damage . . "0

This provision was intended to clarify that
a contribution can only be recovered in respect of foreign liabilities
that would be recognised by English law. A failure to do so would
have left open the possibility that a claim that could not have been
enforced directly against the defendant in England could be
enforced against him indirectly by means of an action for
contribution."'
In other words, if the original plaintiff could not pursue the claim directly
against the sovereign entity in English court because of foreign sovereign
immunity,112 then the corporate joint tortfeasor likewise has no authority
under English law to do so indirectly through a contribution claim.
Applying section 1(6) of the 1978 Act, an international arbitral panel
likely would follow suit and preclude a claim of contribution by the
corporation against a sovereign joint tortfeasor. If, however, section 1(6) did
not foreclose the original claim against the sovereign entity," then the
arbitral panel would have broad discretion to apportion liability between the
tortfeasors according to its understanding of what is fair and equitable in the
109. Civil Liability (Contribution) Act § 2(1). The court also has the power to exempt a party
completely, or order a complete indemnity. Id § 2(2); DEAKIN, JOHNSTON & MARKESINIS, supra
note 38, at 1036-37.
110. Civil Liability (Contribution) Act § 1(6).
Ill. Office of Fair Trading v. Lloyds TSB Bank plc., (2006] EWCA (Civ) 268, [1081 (Eng.),
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/268.htmil.
112. See State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § I (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1978/cukpga_19780033_enI.
113. If, for example, one of the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity applied. See id. §§ 211; Summers v. Stubbs, [2002] EWHC (QB) 3213, [28] (U.K.) ("[]s the action brought against
Milan as a public body acting as such or against it acting as any private individual, the answer is, in
my judgment, that the claim for contribution is a matter of private law notwithstanding that it would
be brought against a public authority against the background of its exercise of public law
functions."). A contractual right to contribution or indemnification also would be enforced
notwithstanding section 1(6). See Civil Liability (Contribution) Act § 7(3) ("[N]othing in this Act
shall affect-(a) any express or implied contractual or other right to indemnity; or (b) any express
contractual provision regulating or excluding contribution. . . .").
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circumstances.
The second scenario involving arbitration in New York applying New York
law is similarly complex, but presents a strikingly different result. New York
has adopted a threshold approach for joint and several liability, meaning that if
the corporation was less than fifty percent responsible, then it is not jointly and
severally liable for any non-economic harm. Article 16 of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules provides that:
[W]hen a verdict or decision in an action or claim for personal injury is
determined in favor of a claimant in an action involving two or more
tortfeasors jointly liable ... and the liability of a defendant is found to
be fifty percent or less of the total liability assigned to all persons liable,
the liability of such defendant to the claimant for non-economic loss
shall not exceed that defendant's equitable share determined in
accordance with the relative culpability of each person causing or
contributing to the total liability for non-economic loss .... 4
The purpose of the law, according to the New York Court of Appeals, is to
"remedy the inequities created by joint and several liability on low-fault, 'deep
pocket' defendants,""' precisely the situation contemplated under our
hypothetical. Article 16 further stipulates that this threshold requirement would
apply to a claim for contribution, unless "the parties acted knowingly and
intentionally, and in concert, to cause the acts ... upon which liability is
based.""' 6 Thus, an international arbitration panel seated in New York applying
New York law could apply the threshold limitations of Article 16 to award a
contribution claim that would severely limit the monetary liability of a corporate
joint tortfeasor.
These two scenarios highlight the complex nature of contribution claims
brought in international arbitration following domestic litigation involving
international law violations. Applying English law, a low-fault, deep-pocket
corporation would have little recourse in pursuing a contribution claim against a
sovereign joint tortfeasor in arbitration. But applying New York law, that same
corporation may have most or all of its liability shifted to the sovereign joint
tortfeasor.
114. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601 (McKinney 1997); see generally Joel Slawotsky, New York's Article
16 and Multiple Defendant ProductLiability Litigation:A Time to Rethink the Impact of Bankrupt
Shares on Judgment Molding, 76 ST. JOHN L. REv. 397 (2002).
115. Rangolan v. Cnty. of Nassau, 749 N.E.2d 178, 182 (N.Y. 2001).
116. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1602 ("The limitations set forth in this article shall: 1. apply to any claim for
contribution or indemnification .... 11. not apply to any parties found to have acted knowingly or
intentionally, and in concert, to cause the acts or failures upon which liability is based . . . ."); see
also Frank v. Meadowlakes Dev. Corp., 849 N.E.2d 938, 939-40 (N.Y. 2006); Morales v. Cnty. of
Nausau, 724 N.E.2d 756, 757-59 (N.Y. 1999); Roseboro v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 472,
473-76 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Siler v. 146 Montague Assocs., 652 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318-19 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997); Didner v. Keene Corp., 593 N.Y.S.2d 238, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Rezucha v.
Garlock Mech. Packing Co., 606 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972-73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
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V. CONCLUSION

International law and tort law share a common assumption: that a victim
of aggression should have legal recourse when a perpetrator unlawfully uses
violence to subordinate his will on the victim.117 As international law
increasingly creates rights and imposes duties on non-state actors, it is
inevitable that questions of joint responsibility will arise. Questions
surrounding the apportionment of fault among joint tortfeasors who violate
international law are, or soon will be, among the most important and
unsettled in human rights litigation.
In establishing general principles of international law, the tort laws of all
major legal systems are relevant. In fashioning a federal common law for
domestic litigation, the tort law of the United States will be of preeminent
importance. When arbitral panels apply the choices of the contracting
parties to resolve apportionment issues, one domestic tort regime chosen by
the parties will be central, and it may differ from the law applied in the
original action. Eventually international tribunals, domestic courts, and
arbitral panels will face the issue involving joint liability for international
law violations. When they do, principles derived from domestic tort law
will be of critical importance for their resolution.

117. See supratext accompanying notes 8-9.
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